Nuclear Weapons and Military Conflict: A Quantitative Analysis.

Does Nuclear Weapons Possession Increase the Likelihood of State Involvement in Military Conflicts?

The theoretical Background.

The question of whether the possession of nuclear weapons contributes to the escalation of military conflicts remains a complex and contested issue within international security studies. Proponents of nuclear deterrence argue that nuclear weapons serve as the ultimate deterrent. The credible threat of a nuclear retaliatory strike ostensibly dissuades states from engaging in aggressive behavior, given the catastrophic costs such actions would entail for all parties involved. This logic underpins the theory of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), which posits that the existence of nuclear arsenals fosters strategic stability by deterring great powers from initiating direct military confrontations.123

Conversely, critics contend that nuclear weapons may lower the threshold for conventional military interventions. States possessing nuclear capabilities might feel emboldened to engage in conventional warfare or support proxy conflicts, relying on their nuclear deterrent to shield them from direct attacks.45 Moreover, the perceived threat of a preemptive strike could incentivize other states to pursue nuclear armament, thereby fueling an arms race and increasing the risk of miscalculations and inadvertent escalation. This duality highlights the complex role of nuclear weapons in international security dynamics.

The empirical Analysis.

An analysis of the temporal distribution of conflicts shows fluctuations in the involvement of nuclear states over the studied period. While direct conflicts between nuclear states are rare, the data indicate periods of increased military activity by nuclear states as aggressors, often coinciding with geopolitical tensions.

Figure 1-Number of Conflicts Involving Nuclear States as Attackers and Defenders per Year.

This line chart presents the annual number of military conflicts involving nuclear-armed states from 1946 to 2024, distinguishing between their roles as attackers (red line) and defenders (blue line). The data reveal several important insights into the behavior and involvement of nuclear states in international conflicts.

Firstly, the red line shows that nuclear states have consistently been involved as attackers in a relatively stable number of conflicts each year, typically ranging between approximately 9 and 15 conflicts annually. This indicates that nuclear-armed states frequently initiate or participate actively in military confrontations, reflecting their significant military capabilities and geopolitcal interests worldwide.

In contrast, the blue line, representing conflicts where nuclear states act as defenders, is markedly lower and more variable, with annual conflict counts often below 5. This suggests that nuclear states are less frequently targeted or forced into defensive military engagements. The lower and fluctuating number of defensive conflicts supports the theory of nuclear deterrence, which posits that the possession of nuclear weapons discourages potential adversaries from launching direct attacks against nuclear-armed states.

The fluctuations in both lines correspond to historical geopolitical events, such as the Cold War period, regional conflicts, and more recent military engagements. The relatively steady presence of nuclear states as attackers underscores their active role in shaping global security dynamics, while their limited role as defenders highlights the protective effect of nuclear arsenals. Overall, this corrected diagram illustrates the dual nature of nuclear-armed states in international security: they are both prominent initiators of military conflicts and beneficiaries of a deterrent effect that reduces their vulnerability to direct attacks.

This Analysis illustrate the complex role of nuclear weapons in international conflicts. The Cold War exemplifies the deterrent effect of nuclear arsenals, while conflicts in South Asia and the ongoing Ukraine war highlight the active military engagement of nuclear states. The regional analysis reveals that nuclear-armed states are predominantly involved in conflicts in specific geopolitical hotspots, such as South Asia, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe. These regions are characterized by complex security dynamics where nuclear deterrence plays a critical role. The conflicts involving nuclear states vary in type and intensity, ranging from low-intensity border skirmishes to high-intensity conventional wars. The Proxy wars are a notable feature, reflecting the strategic use of indirect conflict to avoid direct nuclear confrontation.

Conclusion.

This analysis highlights the complex and multifaceted role of nuclear weapons in military conflicts. While nuclear deterrence appears effective in reducing direct attacks on nuclear states, these states remain key actors in global military dynamics. The results suggest that nuclear- armed states are significantly less likely to be targeted as victims of military aggression, consistent with the deterrence hypothesis. However, nuclear states appear more frequently as aggressors in military conflicts, with the number of conflicts involving nuclear states as attackers ranging from 337 to 409.

It is important to note that the UCDP dataset focuses on armed conflicts exceeding a defined threshold of violence, thereby excluding subtler forms of aggression such as cyber warfare, economic sanctions, or political coercion, which fall outside the scope of this analysis.

These findings imply that while nuclear weapons may deter attacks against their possessors, nuclear states remain active participants in military confrontations, raising important considerations for debates on nuclear deterrence and international stability. The results have significant implications for nuclear disarmament negotiations and international security policy. Understanding the active role of nuclear states in conflicts is crucial for designing effective arms control measures and reducing the risk of escalation.

References:

1. https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/
2. Sagan, Scott D. The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons.

Princeton University Press.1993

3. Tannenwald, Nina. The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945. Cambridge University Press.2007

4. Jervis, Robert. The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy. Cornell University Press.1984

5. Waltz, Kenneth N.The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better. Adelphi Papers.1981

6. Schelling, Thomas C.. Arms and Influence. Yale University Press.196